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Book Reviews
State Administrative Law. By Frank E. Cooper. Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Indianapolis: 1965. Vols. I & II. Pp. 951, including
index. $35.00.
This book is intended to be a comprehensive study of state administrative law, making available to those interested in the development
of such law - as opposed to federal law - a treatise devoted solely to
the subject. The need for such a book is clear to anyone who has
attempted to research a question of administrative law as it pertains to
the various states. There has been no basic source for such research,
and the frustrated researcher was usually forced to examine a multitude
of indices. The leading treatise on administrative law, by Professor
Kenneth C. Davis,' is sometimes helpful, but it is directed more toward
federal than state law. Thus, the need is clear; whether Mr. Cooper's
work is a complete answer is debatable. Indeed, there is a serious question whether any book designed as a general study of state administrative law could completely meet the need.
Administrative law is often thought of as nebulous, internally contradictory, rapidly changing and generally bewildering. Such a view
is probably not unfair. It can be stated in defense of this much-maligned
area of the law that nothing more should be expected of a comparatively
recent set of legal principles asked to serve equally well all types and
sizes of administrative agencies, regardless of their diverse natures,
purposes, organizations and personnel. The difficulty of describing and
commenting upon such an area of the law as respects one jurisdiction such as the federal government or a particular state - is obvious.
Imagine, then, the difficulty (or perhaps impossibility) of performing
such a function regarding all fifty states.
Mr. Cooper's understanding of administrative law, from both a
scholarly and practical viewpoint, is one of the strong points of the
book.2 He is able to discuss and present complicated phases of the
subject with clarity and brevity, without sacrificing thoroughness, and
yet consistently tempering theoretical ideals with the common sense and
practicality of an experienced attorney.
Mr. Cooper uses the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act' as his frame of reference for studying state statutes and
1. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW (1958).
2. Mr. Cooper, a practicing attorney in Detroit, has taught administrative law
at the University of Michigan Law School and acted as consultant to the committee of
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which wrote the Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act promulgated in 1961. He is the author of
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS (1951);

THE LAWYER AND ADAUIlNISTRA-

(1947); and CAsES ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIRUNALS (3d Ed. 1957),
written jointly with Dean E. Blythe Stason.
3. 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 117 (Supp. 1965).
TIVE AGENCIES
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judicial decisions relating to the procedural aspects of administrative
agencies. Rule making, contested cases, licensing and judicial review,
for example, are discussed in the same order as they appear in the
Revised Model Act. These specific topics are introduced by chapters
on the history of state agencies, separation of powers and delegation of
powers, which are general topics not dealt with in the Revised Model
Act. Under each of these subjects, the author endeavors to analyze the
existing statutory and judicial law of the states and then to compare
the rule suggested by the Commissioners in the act. This format permits a logical and coordinated development of the discussion, providing
the reader a well-lighted path through what otherwise might be impenetrable darkness.
Mr. Cooper's explanations and presentations of many difficult
concepts in administrative law - e.g., delegation of powers, the right
to a hearing, primary jurisdiction - are probably the best parts of
the book. They are clear, complete and should be understandable to
even the beginning student in administrative law. For this reason, the
book is valuable as a basic text for someone with an unfamiliar problem
in administrative law who wants a starting place for consideration of
the matter. This is so whether the problem concerns federal or state
law, because the basic issues and rules of administrative law are the
same in both jurisdictions, even though the solutions and applications
may sometimes be different. These discussions are also valuable to
someone engaged in framing or evaluating legislation dealing with
administrative agencies, and, indeed, the book was intended in great
part to benefit just such people. For instance, Mr. Cooper explores at
great length the advantages and disadvantages of the delegation of
powers from a legislative body to an administrative agency and lists
seven possible bad results of such action, which he states "may wisely
be considered by those engaged in the drafting of legislative standards
designed to channel administrative discretion."
Of what value is this book to someone interested in the administrative law of a particular state? In most instances, the answer will
be that it is of very little value once the general principles of the problem are understood, for the book does not attempt to present in detail
the law of any particular state. As an illustration, the chapter on
delegation of powers cites two Maryland cases for the proposition that
such a delegation to an agency is invalid unless the legislation contains
definite standards limiting the discretion of the agency: Tighe v.
Osborne,4 decided in 1925, and Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan,5
decided in 1942. No other Maryland case is cited on this subject,
although the law of our state has progressed far beyond the preliminary
principles enunciated by those decisions. The reader looks in vain for
any mention of more recent cases such as Maryland Coal & Realty Co.
v. Bureau of Mines6 and Pressman v. Barnes,7 which upheld such
legislation without any standards at all. Similarly, the chapter dealing
4.
5.
6.
7.

149
180
193
209

Md.
Md.
Md.
Md.

349,
377,
627,
544,
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121 A.2d 816 (1956).
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with the constitutional right to a hearing discusses the propensity of
"older" cases to rely on distinctions between "judicial" and "legislative" functions and between "rights" and "privileges" as an aid in
decision; but it does not refer to the fairly recent Maryland case of
Albert v. Public Serv. Comm'n,8 where our Court of Appeals relied
on just such distinctions. These illustrations are representative of
most of the book, and so, as a research tool, it has severe limitations.
The position of Mr. Cooper as one of the draftsmen of the Revised
Model Act, and his decision to gear his discussions to the format of
the act, give this book a special character. It is greatly oriented to the
thinking of the draftsmen of the act and is, in a sense, proselytizing
those state legislatures which have not yet seen the wisdom of adopting
the act. The views of the Conference of Commissioners are certainly
worthy of consideration, especially in a state such as Maryland which
has adopted the original Model Act.9 The appendix, containing a
history of the preparation of the original and revised Model Acts and
the text of the Revised Act with comments, is especially helpful as a
ready reference source.
On the other hand, Mr. Cooper's situation as an advocate of the
Revised Model Act may have hindered to some extent an objective
appraisal of the act. This model legislation is the work of a committee
and, like most products of committees, no doubt represents a consensus submerging many differing opinions. The act certainly has
numerous merits, but there is still room for constructive criticism. For
instance, the act requires state agencies to follow the rules of evidence
in civil cases unless the facts are not reasonably susceptible of proof
thereby. Mr. Cooper favors this rule, relying in great part on the trend
of the large federal agencies to adopt the legal rules of evidence. Yet,
at the beginning of the book, he emphatically points out that state
agencies in general are different from federal agencies; they are smaller,
often staffed by part-time personnel, and less professional in character.
If so - and there is no doubt that such a difference exists - why
should the largely unprofessional state agencies be required to follow
legal rules of evidence just because the more sophisticated federal
agencies do? Also, Mr. Cooper discusses at great length the difference
between the "clearly erroneous" test and the "substantial evidence"
test, as respects the scope of judicial review of agency action, and
explains why the draftsmen of the Revised Model Act chose the former,
despite the fact that the latter was used in the original Model Act.
He considers this change a significant improvement. The relevant
language permits a court to reverse agency action which is "clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence
on the whole record."'" Why, it may be asked, did the draftsman use
the words "substantial evidence" in setting forth the "clearly erroneous"
test ? Does this really facilitate clarity in understanding the difference
between the two tests?
8. 209 Md. 27, 120 A.2d 346 (1956).
9. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 41, §§ 244-56 (1965).
10. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AcT § 15(g)
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In summary, this book is an extremely competent attempt to perform a task of overwhelming proportions. It is not the definitive work
on state administrative law, but until the definitive work arrives if that time ever comes - this book will be a real asset.
Leonard E. Cohen*

Judicial Control Of Administrative Action. By Louis L. Jaffe. Little,
Brown and Company, Boston: 1965. Pp. xvi, 792. $20.00.
Professor Jaffe, Byrne Professor of Administrative Law at Harvard Law School, has provided us with an excellent treatise on the
relationship between courts and officers administering powers delegated to them by the legislature. The originality and depth of the
work make it a substantial new contribution to the growing area of
administrative law. The approach of the present work differs from
that of the well-known treatise by Kenneth E. Davis' in that the latter
centers on agency use of the administrative process under rules and
procedures determined by the legislature, the courts and the agencies
themselves, while the former centers almost exclusively on the role of
the courts in controlling administrative action. Professor Jaffe structures his chapters around the thesis that agencies and courts, acting
within the matrix of the legislative delegation of power, are - or
should be - in a harmonious partnership of law-making and lawapplying. Most of the book grew out of a series of articles published
chiefly in the HarvardLaw Review, but Professor Jaffe has substantially revised and up-dated his earlier presentations. All who toil in
the amorphous area of administrative law should greatly benefit from
this assembling of the major contributions of a scholar who has
devoted his career to public service and teaching.
Professor Jaffe's task of depicting the relationship between courts
and agencies is indeed an ambitious one. Modern social and regulatory
legislation has spawned a myriad of agencies, each with its own function, outlook and procedure. The term "agency" covers such diverse
governmental units as independent federal regulatory commissions,
state licensing and public health boards, and both federal and state
executive officers with delegated rule-making or adjudicatory authority.'
Such diversity raises a basic question: can there be a single body of
"administrative law?" The treatise attempts to answer this question
affirmatively by including within its scope all the above areas of delegated authority; each chapter stands on its own as a compact essay on
* A.B. 1953, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1958, Harvard Law School;
Partner, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway, Gump & Kaufman, Baltimore.
1.
2.
and the
(1965),

DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1958).

Both the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 1002(a) (1965),
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 244(a)
define "agency" in very broad terms.
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a particular topic of administrative law. Perhaps Professor Jaffe tries

too hard at times to reconcile conflicting authorities on the basis of
over-subtle distinctions. Nevertheless, his essays contain a precise
analysis of 3existing law and many thoughtful suggestions for its
development.

The heart of the treatise concerns the availability and scope of
judicial review. Professor Jaffe skillfully uses English legal history
in depicting the efforts of Sir Edward Coke, Lord Holt and the other
great judges who fashioned the doctrine of the rule of law. Under
this doctrine, the King's officers were subject to the law and could be
sued in damages for their violations of the law; the courts could thus
order the King's officers to account for their conduct. From this
accountability of royal officers to the courts, Professor Jaffe formulates the presumption that an individual whose interest is acutely and
immediately affected by an administrative action has a right to secure
at some point a judicial determination of its validity. Although the
United States Supreme Court during the nineteenth century demonstrated a considerable deference to executive authority not in accord
with this presumption, the court took a sudden and dramatic turn
in 1902 in School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,4 where it
reviewed a fraud order of the Postmaster General barring the affected
party from the use of the mails.
This presumption of reviewability of administrative action has
encountered rough sailing in areas of sovereign immunity, administrative discretion and statutory exclusion of judicial review. Professor
Jaffe treats these topics as part of what he calls the "common law"
of judicial review. Viewing sovereign immunity as a purely historical
doctrine requiring consent as a basis for certain suits affecting the
treasury, property or contracts of the state, he criticizes the opinion
of Chief Justice Vinson in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp.' In Larson, the War Assets Administrator, who was authorized
by statute to dispose of surplus government property, had contracted
to deliver surplus coal to the Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation, which had already acquired an export license. When the
Administrator refused to perform the contract, the corporation sought
to enjoin him from selling the coal to anyone else. The Court dismissed the suit as one brought against the United States without its
consent, reasoning that immunity attached because the Administrator
was acting within his statutory authority, even if it were assumed that
his construction of the contract was erroneous and his failure to de3. Introductory chapters discuss the Nature of the Administrative Process and
the Delegation of Legislative Power. Subsequent chapters discuss Primary Jurisdiction, The System of Judicial Remedies, Sovereign Immunity, Damage Action against
Governments and Officers, Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, Right to
Judicial Review, Ripeness and Reviewable Orders, Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, Standing to Secure Judicial Review, and the Scope of Judicial Review
on Questions of Law, Questions of Fact, and on Constitutional and Jurisdictional
Facts. With the assistance of several of his students, Professor Jaffe has added
chapters, which have not previously appeared in article form, on Temporary Judicial
Stays and on Exclusive Jurisdiction and Remand.
4. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
5. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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liver the coal in breach of the contract. Professor Jaffe rightly argues
that if the officer's statutory authority in this sense is taken to mean
that all his decisions, whether valid or not, are beyond question by a
court, the law of judicial review would cease to exist. A more acceptable rationale for Larson, proposed by Professor Jaffe, is that the
action was for breach of contract and that the bar of sovereign immunity prevents the plaintiff from obtaining from the United States
without its consent not only money damages, but also specific performance, which was what the injunction really demanded.
The statutory authority assigned to the War Assets Administrator
in Larson resembles the discretion, or power to choose, which is the
hallmark of the administrator. Often this discretion serves to insulate
administrative action from judicial review, but Professor Jaffe argues
that an exercise of discretion is presumptively reviewable for legal
error, procedural defect or "abuse." Section 10 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act codifies this presumption of reviewability and
clearly implies that judicial review is available, despite the presence
of discretion. Professor Jaffe acknowledges that there remain troublesome areas of non-reviewability where statutes either expressly or by
implication exclude judicial review, or where the nature of the administrative area (foreign affairs, defense functions, government dispensing
of privileges) prevents such review. Recent decisions6 indicate that
these areas of non-reviewability may be decreasing, and Professor Jaffe
believes that such well-known decisions denying review as Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Bd. 7 and Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.'
have borne little fruit. The present treatise will no doubt hasten this
seemingly desirable trend toward increased judicial review. I only
wish that Professor Jaffe had delved more deeply into political theory
to explain why increased judicial review is desirable. Are courts necessarily better than agencies? Are judges the only guardians of legality
and of individual rights in our political system? Are there not other
and better controls over administrative action than judicial review,
e.g., legislative reform, an ombudsman on the Swedish model,9 or a
requirement that administrators act fully in the open? These questions
remain largely unanswered. I also regret that Professor Jaffe felt
compelled to state his conclusions on the constitutional basis for judicial
review in such cautious and limited terms. A stronger argument for
a broad constitutional requirement of judicial review might place the
author's presumption of reviewability on firmer ground than the
common law of judicial review, whose very existence has been denied.' °
6. E.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958)
(army discharge held
reviewable).
7. 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (losing union sought review of the certification of its
rival as a collective bargaining representative).
8. 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (steel company did not have standing to challenge Secretary's determination of "locality" for prevailing minimum wage).
9. See Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieonbudsman,75 YALS L.J. 1 (1965). The
idea of an official watch-dog or ombudsman to whom private citizens can direct complaints against governmental action has spread from Sweden to a number of smaller
nations.
10. Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said, "There is no such thing as a common law
of judicial review in the federal courts." Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 312
(1944) (dissenting opinion).
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My chief reservation about the treatise as a whole coincides
with my reservation on the study of administrative law through the
use of appellate opinions of federal and state judges reviewing a great
variety of agencies." I am not certain that there is a cohesive body of
law indentifiable as "administrative law." Rather, there seem to be
many smaller bodies of law surrounding the Federal Communications
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, state Workmen's
Compensation Boards and other individual agencies. Different agencies
have different tasks, outlooks and procedures; each agency has developed, through the course of administration, its own particular body
of law. A judge reviewing the action of a particular agency realizes
that his decision must form part of this body of law. Furthermore, a
judicial decision reviewing the action of one agency may have only a
marginal effect on other agencies.
Professor Jaffe very likely would agree with these generalizations.
In discussing the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reviewing FCC licensing, he recognizes that the judges who imposed
onerous procedural requirements on the FCC may well have been influenced by the tortuous and confused course adopted by that agency in
awarding licenses without the guidance of intelligible standards. In
the two Philco'2 decisions, the court held that Philco was entitled to
protest the renewal of NBC's Philadelphia TV license at the administrative hearing level as a "party in interest," despite the apparent
remoteness of Philco's interest in the renewal. While Professor Jaffe
disapproves this judicial tactic of interfering in procedural matters to
obstruct or delay an unsatisfactory agency policy, the structure of his
treatise does not permit full recognition of the more important point
that the court's willingness to permit intervention at the administrative
level may reflect more the law of the FCC than "administrative law."
The way a court's decision reflects the law of the agency under
review is perhaps better illustrated by an analysis of the scope of judicial
review on questions of law. Professor Jaffe suggests as a general
criterion that the reviewing court should permit the agency to make
law and policy ("exercise its discretion") up to the point where the
court becomes convinced that the agency has contradicted the clear
purpose of its statutory delegation. However, in a number of labor
law decisions during the 1964 Term, the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated a remarkable disregard for the law-making competence
of the NLRB.' On such difficult and controversial issues as the scope
of mandatory collective bargaining,' 4 the impact on employees' rights
of a lockout, 15 and the effect on employees of an actual or threatened
discriminatory plant closing,' 6 the Court paid little heed to the Board's
11. On this point, see especially Westwood, The Davis Treatise: The Meaning to
the Practitioner,43 MINN. L. Rev. 607 (1959).
12. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Philco Corp. v. FCC,
257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
13. See Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YAL4 L.J.

59 (1965).
14.
15.
Brown,
16.

Fireboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 650 (1964).
American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965);
380 U.S. 278 (1965).
NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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judgment and freely announced its own. The Court seems to have
lost faith in the Board because of the Board's hesitation and frequent
reversals in resolving policy questions; at the same time, the Justices
seem to have developed confidence in their own mastery of labor law
and in their ability to shape national labor policy.
In sharp contrast stand recent Court decisions in FTC and FPC7
cases, where the Court upheld considerable agency law-making powers.1
Perhaps it is slightly unfair to cite decisions more recent than Professor Jaffe's book, but I do so not to show that he has incorrectly
analyzed any cases, but rather to show that his "clear purpose" criterion
does not sufficiently reflect that the Supreme Court behaves differently
in reviewing different agencies. The treatise is simply not structured
to recognize this basic fact. What we need, in addition to this type of
book, are more basic texts along the lines of Loss's Securities Regulations"8 and Henderson's excellent but outdated study of the Federal
Trade Commission."9 Such texts would center on a particular agency
and would recognize that each agency has developed its own body of
law. An important question which still remains unanswered is to what
extent the courts should develop basic principles of a uniform "administrative law" which would apply to control the actions of most or all
agencies. Professor Jaffe's work certainly prompts such a development, but he does not discuss whether this development would prevent
adequate consideration of the special accomplishments and problems
of individual agencies.
Professor Jaffe has made an excellent contribution to legal literature, which should prove invaluable to judges, scholars, practitioners
and all who are interested in the operation of the judicial system. In
this treatise he brings balanced judgment, deep understanding, and
considerable wisdom to the pervasive problem of the relationship
between the courts and the growing number of agencies which play so
great a part in the governmental system. In light of the ambitiousness
of the task, the work must certainly be judged a success.
Edward A. Tomlinson*
17. E.g., United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223
(1 9 6 5 ) ; FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
18. Loss, SECURITIS REGULATION (2d ed. 1961).
19. HxNDERSON, THt FEDERAL TRAD4 COMMISSION (1924).

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

